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I. INTRODUCTION
HROUGHT the twentieth century, jurisprudence in Europe and
America has focused to a great extent on judicial method and
practice. The critical study of adjudicative practice, in fact, may
well be the theme for which the century's jurisprudence will be
remembered. This study has led to a wide and impressive array of theo-
ries seeking to answer the many questions that have arisen regarding judi-
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Idaho; Faculty member, National
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cial practice, including the role and function of courts in modern, complex
legal systems, the nature of the judicial process, the forms and methods of
judicial interpretation of law, and the ethical ideal of the "good judge."
One particularly thorny and recurring question in this vein concerns
the role of "logic" in judicial decisionmaking. Ever since Oliver Wendell
Holmes declared that, "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience,"' jurisprudential writers, especially in the United States, have
sought to downplay the significance of logic in adjudication. Much of the
impetus for this effort has been the notion, widely held during the nine-
teenth century and persistently resilient throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, that judicial decisionmaking in the main follows a simple logical
structure, where a court's decision represents the conclusion of a deduc-
tive syllogism in which the major premise is a preexisting general legal
rule and the minor premise a statement of the facts established in the
case.2 By this notion, which came to be called (largely by its critics)
"Legal Formalism," courts perform the basically ministerial or "mechani-
cal ' 3 function of identifying the controlling general role, determining
whether the facts make the case at bar an instance thereof, and then issu-
ing the decision that logic dictates.4
Jurisprudential criticism of legal formalism became widespread in both
the United States and Europe during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Parallel jurisprudential movements took hold on each side of the
Atlantic. In the United States, the new wave of jurisprudential thought
came to be known as "Legal Realism," while on the European continent
it was called "Free Legal Decision" or the "Free Law Movement."
Among the more controversial points raised by jurists in each of these
movements was the claim that, despite appearances, logic, especially in
the sense of deductive inference, plays only a secondary role in judicial
decisionmaking. Several of the legal realist and free decision writers
maintained that while judicial decisions often give the appearance of logi-
cal reasoning and form, judicial method actually depends, to a far greater
extent, on a judge's "intuitions" or "sense of justice." As stated by one of
the American legal realists, the true basis of legal judgment is not logic
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. See, e.g., Everett V. Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts 11, 10 HARV. L. REV. 479,
482 (1897).
3. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (criti-
cizing legal formalism).
4. See Abbot, supra note 2, at 482. This conception of judicial decision making as a
non-discretionary enterprise bounded by logic goes back to at least the jurisprudential
writings of eighteenth century philosophers in the rationalist tradition. Cesare Beccaria,
for example, wrote in 1764:
In every criminal case, a judge should come to a perfect syllogism: the major
premise should be the general law; the minor premise, the act which does or
does not conform to the law; and the conclusion, acquittal or condemnation.
If the judge were constrained to form even two syllogisms, or if he were to
choose to do so, then the door to uncertainty would be opened.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 11 (David Young trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1986) (1764).
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but an "intuitive flash of understanding," the inarticulable "hunch" that a
certain result "feels" right. 5
Direct debate over the respective roles of logic and intuition in the
process of adjudication has waned since the heydays of legal realism and
free legal decision in the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, the debate has
been kept alive through the work of several more recent jurists who have
treated it as an underlying fundamental issue preliminary to any mean-
ingful inquiry into judicial method.6 H.L.A. Hart stands at the forefront
of those who have contributed in this way to the logic-intuition debate.
As with every other issue in analytic jurisprudence that he tackled, Pro-
fessor Hart offered to this debate critical insight and a moderating voice
that is well worth our reexamination. To Professor Hart, both sides of
the debate-the formalists and the realists/free law thinkers-represent
indefensible extremes. While each side identified salient features of judi-
cial practice, their common tendency to emphasize certain features to the
exclusion of other important aspects of the practice rendered their works
irredeemably flawed. Hart accordingly sought to bring to the debate a
middle ground; at once emphasizing the importance of logic while ac-
knowledging its limitations, likewise recognizing the presence of intuition
while rejecting the claim that judges are free to decide cases according to
their hunches or feelings wholly independent of logical constraints.
This Article examines Professor Hart's contribution to the logic-intui-
tion debate. I argue that he largely succeeded in tempering the extremes
by showing that the debate itself rests on confusion. In some of the most
philosophically important passages of his vast jurisprudential output,
Hart argued that the root error of legal formalism is not an over-reliance
on logical form, but a misunderstanding of language. Formalism, he
claimed, rests fundamentally on the belief that legal concepts are linguis-
tically fixed or closed. Accordingly, the formalists were unable or unwill-
ing to recognize that legal terms and concepts are, as he put it, inherently
"open-textured" 7 and that problems of legal interpretation can arise in a
concept's "penumbra": 8 the hazy, borderline area outside its "core of set-
tled meaning."9 By Hart's account, that is, deductive logic is not founda-
tional for legal formalism but a tool, an attractive implement of reason
for legal theorists who, because they view a society's law as a complete
and harmonious unity of predetermined rules and principles, cannot con-
ceive of problems of legal definition or meaning arising which logic can-
not resolve.
5. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
6. See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 194-206 (1979).
See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing roles of logic and intuition).
7. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-35 (2d ed. 1994).
8. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN




Yet Hart did not only regard formalism as untenable. To him, legal
realism and free law theory were mistaken as well. As we will see, he
found their endorsement of intuition in judicial practice, an endorsement
grounded in their mistaken view that logic is the root error of formalism,
to be equally problematic, though for different reasons. He maintained
that the intuitionist account fails when considered within the context of
his positivist description of the foundations of a legal system. In particu-
lar, he claimed that intuition cannot be a central feature of the judicial
process within any legal system regulated in part by the centrally impor-
tant "secondary rules" of "recognition" and "adjudication."'' 1
Before turning to these pivotal aspects of Hart's work, however, we
should consider the background against which he wrote, the background
of legal formalism and its critics where the debate between logic and intu-
ition took root.
II. LEGAL FORMALISM AND ITS CRITICS
A. LEGAL FORMALISM
The term legal formalism has come to stand for the idea that a legal
system can be understood as a simple logical structure consisting of a
complete and comprehensive set of general rules and principles from
which all issues arising within the system can be resolved deductively. So-
called legal formalists tend to see each jurisdiction's law as a logically
closed or fixed system of axioms and corollaries. Within each system, the
practice of judicial decisionmaking is then said to proceed syllogistically,
with the outcome of each case following necessarily from the logical join-
der of its facts with a general rule or principle determined antecedent to
the judicial act.
During the nineteenth century, some formalists, particularly those in
European civil law countries, emphasized the concreteness of the general
rules and principles that they saw determining the results of judicial deci-
sionmaking. This jurisprudential approach, often referred to as "Pandect-
ism,"'" began in part as an attempt to ratify theoretically the codification
movement that swept Europe in the nineteenth century.12 It also fell
under the influence of those legal scholars, particularly from Germany,
who sought to articulate a "jurisprudence of concepts" (Begriffsjuris-
prudenz), a vast, seamless web of legal concepts-rules, principles, and
doctrine-which, taken together as a harmonious whole, was said to re-
veal the systematic, conceptual unity of law over the centuries from the
Roman Empire to nineteenth century Europe. 13 The "pandectists" (legal
scholars of the Roman-German tradition) claimed that the new civil
codes appearing throughout Europe contained the whole of each nation's
10. See HART, supra note 7, at 79-107.
11. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 324-25 (1992).
12. See id. at 311-13; James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law
Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 406-07 (1987).
13. See KELLY, supra note 11, at 324-25; Herget & Wallace, supra note 12, at 405.
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law. 14 They further asserted that in deciding cases courts should look no
further and consult no sources outside the codes themselves. 15 That is,
they conceived of law as a logically closed system wherein right outcomes
in adjudication were said to flow, by logical deduction, from the generally
applicable and definitionally complete legal rules and principles found in
the civil codes. Law, from their point of view, was determinate, objective,
uniform, and predictable, while judicial decisionmaking was mechanical
and nondiscretionary.16
Other formalists, especially those in the United States, conceived of a
"higher law" jurisprudence of formalism. These legal scholars claimed
that law is reducible to abstract general principles discoverable by ra-
tional inquiry into basic philosophical postulates 17 or manifested in the
"universal custom[s] of men."' 8 This version of formalism, appropriately
labeled "Legal Absolutism" by Judge Jerome Frank,19 paralleled
pandectism in describing legal reasoning in syllogistic terms; it differed
only insofar as abstract principles of higher law served as the major prem-
ises instead of principles articulated in written codes. In the words of one
nineteenth century American absolutist, Everett Abbot:
[J]uridical procedure takes a form which in its lowest terms is a syllo-
gism, wherein the major premise is the predication of a juridical prin-
ciple, the minor premise is a predication that the case at bar comes
within its terms as an instance of it, and the conclusion is the joinder
of the two in the final judgment of the court. The ascertainment of
the major premise is the province of the jurist through the process of
logical reasoning; the ascertainment of the minor premise is the
province of the court through its process of investigating facts; and
the conclusion-that is, the judgment-follows, or should follow, in-
evitably upon these two.20
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, jurisprudential thought in
both Europe and the United States began to move away from formalism.
A select group of legal scholars, most significantly Oliver Wendell
Holmes in the United States and Rudolf von Jhering and Oskar Biilow in
Germany, began to question the goals and precepts of formalism. These
jurists, whose work paved the way for the legal realist and free legal deci-
sion movements, stressed that determinacy in legal decision is not princi-
pally a function of logical constraints, but the result of natural ordering
through the free exercise of judicial power.21 Regarding law as a function
of social tendencies and ethical concerns, they maintained that legal rules
14. See KELLY, supra note 11, at 312, 324-25.
15. See id. at 312.
16. See id. at 311-12.
17. See Abbot, supra note 2, at 480-82.
18. JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 123 (1907).
19. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 55 (1930).
20. Abbot, supra note 2, at 482.
21. See, e.g., Oskar Builow, Statutory Law and the Judicial Function, reprinted in 39
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 71, 85-86, 91-94 (1995); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
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are not eternally fixed abstract concepts, but practical doctrines that de-
velop incrementally, like hypotheses of experiential science, when they
are contested in daily human affairs and subjected to the deliberation of
courts.22 Under this conception of law, the deductive method of formal-
ism gave way in importance to the less rigid logical process of analogical
reasoning. Considerations of social interest and economics, 23 as well as
insights drawn from history24 were said to provide a more realistic ac-
count of legal justification than could be drawn from attending only to
deductive inferences from the formal sources of written law25 or even
from the most impressive "throng of glittering generalities. '26 To
Holmes, absolutism rested on a "fallacy of logical form";27 Biulow
charged that pandectism was an "exaggerated statutory cult" that grossly
overstated the interpretive clarity of written law.28 The legal realist and
free decision writers who followed them agreed, though with greater em-
phasis on the role intuition plays in the judicial practice of deciding cases
at law.
B. FREE LEGAL DECISION
The free legal decision movement aimed generally to "free" judges
from all jurisprudential theories and rules of interpretation designed to
make judicial decisionmaking subordinate to the formal sources of writ-
ten law. The free decision jurists rejected the central precepts of formal-
ism-that every legal question can be answered through objective
interpretation of written law29 and that the justness of legal rules does not
change over time. 30 Conceiving of adjudication as an inherently free and
creative enterprise,3' the free decision writers saw the objective of juris-
prudential theory, insofar as it addresses adjudicative practice, as that of
describing the nature and limits of judicial freedom. 32 Some in the move-
22. See Billow, supra note 21, at 81, 91-92; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 239-42 (1920) [hereinafter Holmes,
Law in Science]; Holmes, supra note 21, at 465-68.
23. See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 22, at 210,238-39; Holmes, supra note
21, at 467-71.
24. See, e.g., Billow, supra note 21, at 94; HOLMES, supra note 1, at 1, 36; Holmes, The
Use of Law Schools, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 35, 41-43 (1920) [hereinafter Holmes,
The Use of Law Schools]; Holmes, The Bar as a Profession, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
153, 156 (1920); Holmes, Bracton De Legihus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 308 (1920); Holmes, supra note 21, at 468-77.
25. See Billow, supra note 21, at 93-94.
26. Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, supra note 24, at 42.
27. Holmes, supra note 21, at 468.
28. Billow, supra note 21, at 91.
29. See Eugen Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in Sci-
ENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 47, 52-54 (Ernest
Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917); Francois Geny, Judicial Freedom of Decision:
Its Necessity and Method, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS BY VARIOUS
AUTHORS, supra, at 1, 2.
30. See Ehrlich, supra note 29, at 72 ("No rule is just for all times.").
31. See id. at 73.
32. See id. at 79 ("One of the duties of legal science is to examine the origin, nature,
effect, and value of the tendencies that become apparent in legal decisions, and thus to
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ment sought to fulfill this goal by identifying "the objective factors to
which all problems of positive law must look for their solution. ' 33 Others
found any such list of factors incomplete, stressing instead the importance
of intuition and sentiment in judicial decisionmaking.
Among those free legal decision jurists who stressed the role of intui-
tion in judicial practice, two stand out: Ernst Fuchs, a German lawyer,
and Johann Georg Gmelin, a Justice on the Austrian Court of Appeals at
Stuttgart. Fuchs characterized judicial decisionmaking as a subjective en-
terprise with few formal limits. Claiming that no written law can possibly
be so comprehensive as to cover every conceivable case, Fuchs reasoned
that statutes and code provisions should not be read as establishing gen-
eral legal rules. Rather, he maintained that statutory provisions should
be read as "specific decisions, '34 i.e., as decision rules extending only to
those cases expressly covered by the statutory language. In all other
cases, courts should exercise a "truly free" method of decisionmaking. 35
And in exercising that freedom, each judge should try, Fuchs wrote, to
issue decisions which exhibit "harmony with a feeling for justice," 36 a
"feeling" drawn from the judge's intuitions and experience on the
bench. 37
Justice Gmelin followed Fuchs in emphasizing the subjective and intui-
tive side of judicial decisionmaking. Gmelin protested against what he
regarded as the unrealistic and crippling limitations imposed by jurispru-
dences of "excessive formalism. '38 Claiming that "true justice cannot be
found in cold, logical ratiocinations, nor by a wisdom garnered in dusty
books,"'39 he characterized as "excessive" nearly all methodological con-
straints on judicial freedom, including obligatory deference to written
codes or statutory texts,40 dutiful reliance on the history of a law's ori-
gin 41 or precedent, 42 and rational deductions from any of these sources.43
Gmelin argued that adjudication leads to justice only when judges mix
reason with sentiment, the head with the heart,44 mollifying the cold de-
furnish a picture of what is going on in the administration of justice and what the causes
thereof may be.").
33. Geny, supra note 29, at 6; see Hermann Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About
Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1245 (1934).
34. See Geza Kiss, Equity and Law: Judicial Freedom of Decision, in SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 160 (Ernest Bruncken & Lay-
ton B. Register trans. 1917) (attributed to Fuchs by Geza Kiss).
35. See id.
36. ERNST FUCHS, DIE GEMEINSCHADLICHKEIT DER KONSTRUKTIVEN JURISPRUDENZ
8, 28 (1909).
37. See id. at 84.
38. See Johann Georg Gmelin, Dialecticism and Technicality: The Need of Sociological
Method, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 85
(Ernest Brancken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917).
39. Id. at 88.
40. See id. at 87, 122.
41. See id. at 94.
42. See id. at 87.
43. See id. at 122.
44. See id. at 88 ("The judge ought to perform his duty not with his head merely but
also with his heart.").
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
mands of logic with what the judge personally "feel[s] to be right and
just."' 45 The sound administration of justice, that is, requires that "the
heart... be allowed a voice by assisting critical reason and controlling the
inferences logic would draw" from the written sources of law. 46 For it is
the heart, not reason, that can mitigate the harshness of the written law,
"harmonizing [it] with the demands of actual life."'47
In short, Gmelin recommended that judges should shun all pretense to
dispassionate, detached objectivity by imagining themselves in the posi-
tions of the contending parties so as to understand and weigh the inter-
ests at stake as if they were their own. He challenged each judge to,
place himself vividly into the circumstances of the parties appearing
in the various tragedies and comedies on his docket, so that he may
realize how they felt when they acted as they did, what ends they
may have pursued, and whether such pursuit can be held blameless
when considered with a view to the general welfare.48
Here judges must rely, Gmelin thought, on their "subjective or individ-
ual sense of justice. '49 By this he was not recommending merely an ap-
peal to personal preference. Rather, he believed in an inherent human
sense of justice, an "inborn sentiment" 50 present in all people, only more
finely tuned in the judge.51 "The judge is to point out the true direction of
the sense of justice implanted in all of us," he wrote, "like a magnetic
needle, so to speak." 52
Gmelin further thought that anyone with a fine and cultivated sense of
justice, whether judge or legal scholar, can evaluate and determine cor-
rect outcomes in cases at law.53 On the assumption that the sense of jus-
tice always takes priority over the formal sources of law, he claimed that
decisions on rational deductions from legislative intent are decided
wrongly if they offend the subjective sense of justice.54 Courts, he argued,
should neither rely on "legal deduction[s]" when the subjective sense le-
ans toward equity,55 nor follow even the most learned of legal arguments
if the outcome would make a party "feel that he was being robbed under
the forms of law."'56 No judicial decision is just which appears, to the intu-
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id. at 88.
47. Id. at 88-89.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 125, 127.
50. Id. at 125 ("[AlII men in ordinary life draw their conclusions as to what is just from
this inborn sentiment [of justice]."); cf id. at 88 (the sense of justice is "implanted in all of
Us").
51. See id. at 125 (noting that the sense of justice "may be increased and strengthened
by practice and training," and that the "calling [of the judge] makes it his duty to cultivate
and develop this feeling in himself").
52. Id. at 88.
53. See id. at 127.
54. See id. at 123.
55. Id. at 117.
56. Id. at 120.
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itive sense of justice, to be "inequitable, ' 57 "inhuman,"58 "preposter-
ous,' 5 9 "disgust[ing], ' 60 or otherwise "utterly unsatisfactory."' 61 In sum,
Gmelin maintained that any case that strikes "a feeling of annoyance,
pain or indignation" 62 in the breast of a person with sound judicial intu-
itions can be known, for that reason, to be unjust.
C. LEGAL REALISM
The American legal realists presented similar ideas about the nature
and function of judicial practice. Like the free law movement, legal real-
ism aimed to rebuke and discredit legal formalism. To that end, the legal
realists stressed several points about law in general and adjudication in
particular. Striving to construct a "science" of law, 63 the legal realists
viewed legal systems not as abstract, ideal entities, but as practical reali-
ties designed to serve social ends. 64 They claimed that legal rules and
principles, as well as the rights individuals may enjoy, must be understood
in terms of their real impacts on the lives and behaviors of those they
affect.65 On their account, law and legal rules are not fixed and eternal,
but ever growing and developing, principally through judicial decision-
making.66 They maintained that adjudication unavoidably involves a cer-
tain amount of discretionary "lawmaking" 67 and that within adjudicative
practice, a judge's character (judicial personality) plays at least as sub-
stantial a role as legal doctrine in determining the decisions that will be
reached by that judge.68
It would be fair to say that the priority of intuition over logic in judicial
decisionmaking sounded, if anything did, the clarion call of the legal real-
57. Id. at 114.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Id. at 117.
61. Id. at 114.
62. Id. at 123.
63. See, e.g., Joseph Bingham, What Is The Law? 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1912);
Herman Oliphant, Stare Decisis-Continued, 14 A.B.A. J. 159, 159 (1928).
64. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 63, at 5 (claiming that it is necessary to see law in
terms of its "naked realities if we are to escape being led into false theories"); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1236 (1931) (arguing for a "conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an
end in itself") [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism]. See also Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 448-57 (1930)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence].
65. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 64, at 1247; Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 64, at 442-43.
66. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 19, at 118; KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 108-09, 154-57 (1960); Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism, supra note 64, at 1247. Much of Llewellyn's THE COMMON LAW TRADITION was
devoted to a painstaking study of various examples of judicial development of legal
doctrine.
67. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 103.
68. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 410-15 (1949) [hereinafter FRANK COURTS ON TRIAL]; FRANK, supra note 19, at
111, 133-38; LLEWELLYN, supra note 64, at 128-30; Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial
Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 358 (1925).
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ist movement. Beginning with Holmes, anti-formalist jurists in the
United States repeatedly castigated the legal formalists for over-empha-
sizing the logical structure of legal decisions while simultaneously at-
tempting to hide the role intuition plays in adjudicative practice. Holmes
himself had claimed that judicially "felt necessities ... and ... intuitions
of public policy . .. have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed. ' 69 Other im-
portant forerunners of legal realism agreed. In The Nature of the Judicial
Process, Benjamin Cardozo argued that while logic clearly influences the
development of law over time,70 judicial decisionmaking requires a level
of skill that goes beyond the ability to reason deductively to a practice-
bound judicial "sense of fitness and proportion."'7' Accordingly, he la-
mented when courts merely reason by carrying "a maxim or a definition
with relentless disregard of consequences to a dryly logical extreme," 72 or
when they follow a "formula of inaction" when they should instead be
moved emotionally. 73 And Roscoe Pound, perhaps the most vociferous
critic of formalism between Holmes and the realists, commented:
It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions
that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which
the results purport to flow is sound or not. The trained intuition of
the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puz-
zled to give unimpeachable legal reasons.74
Within the legal realist movement proper, criticism of formalism and an
endorsement of judicial intuitionism came from all corners. Joseph Bing-
ham sought to construct a realistic science of law that would counteract
those jurisprudential theories that he considered to be "a manifestation
of false fundamental notions of logic."'75 To Bingham, "[t]he syllogism
[was] the Palladium" of legal formalism. 76 Herman Oliphant, in his presi-
dential address to the Association of American Law Schools in 1927, like-
wise argued that any "truly scientific study of law" must turn away from
the "vague and shifting rationalizations" of formalism. 77 Encouraging his
fellow academic lawyers to work with their "eyes cleared of the old and
broad abstractions which curtain our vision," 78 Oliphant claimed that the
key to understanding judicial decisions is to recognize that the choices
courts make between legal principles is "not dictated by logic,"'79 but by a
69. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 1.
70. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 38, 47-50, 112
(1921).
71. Id. at 114.
72. Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 N.E. 898, 900 (N.Y. 1921).
73. Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 888 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, C.J.,
dissenting).
74. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923).
75. Bingham, supra note 63, at 17 n.17.
76. Id.
77. Oliphant, supra note 63, at 159.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 160.
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judicial "intuition of fitness of solution to problems."8s
It was a pair of federal district court judges, Joseph C. Hutcheson and
Jerome Frank, who articulated most clearly the realist position that, as
Hutcheson put it, "the imaginative, the intuitional faculty is essential" to
sound judging.81 Claiming that the adjudicative function simply cannot be
fulfilled through the strict, logical application of legal rules and principles,
Hutcheson argued for the importance of the "hunch" in adjudication:
[W]hen the case is difficult or involved, and turns upon a hair-
sbreadth of law or of fact, . . . I, after canvassing all the available
material at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imagi-
nation play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the
hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-
spark connection between question and decision, and at the point
where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along
the way.8 2
To Hutcheson, this "tiptoe faculty of the mind which can feel and fol-
low a hunch" was the distinguishing mark of a good judge.83 By this he
did not mean to endorse an unbounded intuitive sense of justice. Rather,
he meant a judicial intuition honed through training and experience in
law and judicial practice. 84 Acknowledging that judges must state ra-
tional grounds for their decisions,85 Hutcheson conceded that they need
a firm understanding of the law along with the capacity to explain their
judgments rationally within the context of established legal categories
and concepts.86 Nevertheless, on his account the true determining
ground of legal judgment was that intuitive "hunch" that a certain result
"feels" right. 87
Jerome Frank regarded Hutcheson's view "as an approximately correct
description of how all judges do their thinking."88 Taking on legal for-
malism with a vengeance, Frank expressed skepticism toward all of its
central precepts, from the formalist belief that the law contains a com-
plete, predetermined set of rules and general principles,89 to the dogmatic
80. Id. at 159, 161.
81. Hutcheson, supra note 5, at 288.
82. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 285 (claiming that that result "seems desirable to the judge which, ac-
cording to his training, his experience, and his general point of view, strikes him as the jural
consequence that ought to flow from the facts").
85. See id. at 278 ("[W]hat gives the judge the struggle in the case is the effort so to
state the reasons for his judgment that they will past muster."); see also id. at 287 (noting
that judicial opinions "must at least appear reasonable").
86. See, e.g., id. at 286 (noting that once the judge "feels" which result is just and right,
he then "struggles to bring up and pass in review before his eager mind all of the categories
and concepts which he may find useful directly or by analogy, so as to select from them
that which in his opinion will support his desired result").
87. See id. at 285 ("[TJhe judge really feels or thinks that a certain result seems desira-
ble, and he then tries to make his decision accomplish that result.").
88. FRANK, supra note 19, at 104; accord FRANK, COURTs ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at
170.
89. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 51.
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"illusion"' that law is fixed,91 certain,92 and predictable. 93 Frank main-
tained that formalism, which he referred to as "legal Absolutism," 94 cre-
ates the false impression that judicial decisionmaking is a mechanical
activity, 95 a discretionless process of syllogistic reasoning beginning with
"pure," harmonious principles of juridical right determined for all time
antecedent to judicial consideration. 96 But "law is not a machine," Frank
averred, "and the judges not machine-tenders. '97 While formalism may
depict a conception of law appropriate for "superhuman[s],"98 it is wholly
removed from human experience 99 and entirely disconnected from
human law, fraught as it is with contingencies and uncertainties.' 00
Frank surmised that if law is inherently contingent and uncertain, then
judicial freedom and discretion is unavoidable, and the extent to which
judicial decisionmaking leads to just outcomes becomes very much de-
pendent on human nature.10 1 And human nature, on Frank's account,
stands sharply opposed to the absolutist conception of the "ideal
judge"-the dispassionate rational arbiter who coolly and objectively
compares the relevant facts of each case to a set of absolute, eternal, and
universal legal truths.102 Frank maintained that we humans typically do
90. See id. at 118.
91. See id. at 118, 120.
92. See id. at 51, 118.
93. See id. at 34.
94. Id. at 55.
95. See id. at 118.
96. See id. at 55, 101.
97. Id. at 120.
98. Id. at 54.
99. Id. at 54-55. Frank spoke often of the importance of viewing law from the stand-
point of human experience, specifically the experiences of the ordinary, average person.
See, e.g., id. at 55. From this point-of-view, the "law" that matters is what happens in court,
viewed from the perspective of the litigant and the common citizen, not the legal profes-
sional. The bulk of humanity, Frank maintained, does not care about legal generalities.
They worry only about the impact of concrete decisions:
For the ordinary human being is interested, legitimately, in what happens in
court. The decisions of the courts directly affect his life and property. The law
in the sky, above human experience, is valueless to the wayfaring man. Prin-
ciples, rules, conceptions, standards, and the like, may be law for lawyers ..
[b]ut not for the rest of humanity. To mere humans, law means what the
courts have decided and will decide, and not vague, "pure" generalizations.
Id.
Defining law from the perspective of the ordinary, average person was an approach com-
mon to many realists. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 16-17 (1930)
("What the courts will do means nothing save in relation with how people are to act in the
light of the court's doing. For the meaning of the law in life and in the practice of lawyers
is its meaning not to courts, but to laymen."). Holmes focused not on the average person
per se, but the average "bad" person-
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Holmes, supra note 21, at 459.
100. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 34-37, 222-35; see also id. at 287 ("Life... is always to
be unavoidably full of uncontrollables, to be chancy, uncertain.").
101. See id. at 137-39, 145-47.
102. See id. at 145.
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not reason syllogistically from major premise through minor premise to
conclusion. Instead, we start with the conclusion and seek a rationaliza-
tion for it."° 3 Such is the way, he claimed, that most judicial reasoning
proceeds." 4 While rules and principles often enter into a judge's deliber-
ations, the true determining ground of a judicial decision is usually the
judge's "hunch" as to how the case should be resolved.105
Frank, like Hutcheson, conceived of the judicial "hunch" as "a trained
intuition"'0 6 experientially craft-bound to the practice of adjudication. 0 7
Every judge's "hunches" will likely reflect a wide array of factors: the
judge's knowledge of the law;"' 8 his or her moral, political, and economic
biases;1 9 and a bevy of what Frank called "hidden factors,"1 10 i.e., en-
trenched traits of personality and character, prejudices and passions, hab-
its and dispositions, sympathies and antipathies. Frank thought that these
"multitudinous and complicated" '' subjective "hidden norms"' 12 buried
deep in each judge's individual biases, preferences, intuitions, and emo-
tions" 3 shape every aspect of a judge's thought. 1 4 Collectively, they
comprise the "personality of the judge"" 5-the element in judicial deci-
sionmaking that Frank considered most critical:1 1 6  "[N]ot the rules but
the personalities of the judges are of transcendent importance in the
working of the judicial process.""17
It was in regard to the hidden norms and this "personal element"' 1 8 in
adjudication that Frank saw the errors, the "evils" of absolutism.11 9 By
holding forth the myth of the "ideal judge" who objectively and dispas-
sionately decides cases by logical deduction from fixed general rules and
principles, the key element in judicial decision making-judicial personal-
ity-remains hidden.120 A fortiori, so do those judges with "bad" person-
103. See id. at 101.
104. See d. at 102; see also Radin, supra note 68, at 358-59 (characterizing the judicial
method as one "of working their judgment backward, from a desirable conclusion to one
or another of a stock of logical premises").
105. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 103-04, 145; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note
68, at 170-74, 183-84.
106. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 252.
107. See id. at 170-85.
108. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 100-01,104.
109. See id. at 105.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 105-06.
112. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 180.
113. See, e.g., d. at 176-81.
114. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 101, 104-07, 110-11.
115. E.g., id. at 138; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 411.
116. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 111, 133 (calling the personality of the judge the
"pivotal factor" in adjudication); accord FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 410-
15.
117. FRANK, supra note 19, at 136.
118. Id. at 138 ("Efforts to eliminate the personality of the judge are doomed to failure.






alities.121 To Frank, the only way to expose and rid the courts of
dishonest and bigoted judges was to openly acknowledge "the law's in-
herent uncertainty" and the unavoidable freedom and discretion that
judges enjoy. 12 2 We cannot, Frank concluded, ever hope to "get rid of
emotions in the field of justice,"' 1 3 for judicial decisionmaking will ever
depend, at times, on "feelings that words [and logic] cannot ensnare."'1 24
The best guaranty of justice that Frank thought we could possibly attain is
to develop a rank and file of judges whose intuitions are sensitive and
balanced, 125 who are honest and well-trained "with the completest possi-
ble knowledge of the character of [their] powers and of [their] own
prejudices and weaknesses."' 126
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF LEGAL FORMALISM
More than any other writer on jurisprudence during the second half of
the twentieth century, H.L.A. Hart saw the logic-intuition debate as cen-
tral to a full and complete understanding of law and judicial practice.
Hart returned to the debate regularly, addressing it in several essays as
well as in his seminal book The Concept of Law. The position he took
toward it never wavered: both legal formalism and its realist and free
decision critics represented extremes that provided insufficient accounts
of law and, each in their own way, misleading descriptions of judicial
practice. For his part, Hart sought to carve out a middle ground, ac-
knowledging the relevance of both logic and intuition for judicial deci-
sionmaking, while avoiding the all-or-nothing emphases on one to the
exclusion of the other that typified the formalist/anti-formalist debate.
As we will see, certain of his most significant contributions to jurispru-
dential thought play substantial parts in his effort to create a theory of
judicial practice that achieves a workable balance between logic and
intuition.
A. THE VICE OF PREJUDGMENT
To a great extent Hart stood alongside the realists and free decision
jurists as an outspoken critic of legal formalism. Like Judge Frank, who
described the formalist method as a conception of law fit for
superhumans, 127 Hart suggested that while formalism may bear relevance
121. See id.; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 410-12.
122. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 19, at 133-34 ("[Tjhe hope for complete uniformity,
certainty, continuity in law . . . , is gone except to the extent that the personalities of all
judges will be substantially alike, to the extent that the judges will all have substantially
identical mental and emotional habits.").
123. Id. at 143; accord FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 412.
124. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 173.
125. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 143; accord FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note
68, at 412.
126. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 412.
127. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 54.
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to divine lawmaking, it ill-fits the human condition. 128 In law-making, es-
pecially law-making by way of generalized rules of conduct, we humans
"labour[ ] under one supreme handicap," he wrote, i.e., the impossibility
of foreseeing "all possible combinations of circumstances that the future
may bring." 129 Accordingly, it is unavoidable that our laws, whether stat-
utory or judge-made, will be riddled with gaps, uncertainties, and indeter-
minate extensions. 130 This practical reality undermines legal formalism,
Hart thought, forming the basis of its fundamental theoretical error:
The fundamental error [of legal formalism] consists in the belief that
legal concepts are fixed or closed in the sense that it is possible to
define them exhaustively in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions; so that for any real or imaginary case it is possible to say
with certainty whether it falls under the concept or does not; the con-
cept either applies or it does not; it is logically closed (begrenzt).
This would mean that the application of a concept to a given case is a
simple logical operation conceived as a kind of unfolding of what is
already there, and, in simpler Anglo-American formulation, it leads
to the belief that the meaning of all legal rules is fixed and predeter-
mined before any concrete questions of their application arises. 3 1
To Hart, this erroneous account of law is not only misleading, but per-
nicious. In depicting legal concepts as logically closed, the legal formal-
ists had sought to obviate or at least significantly reduce judicial choice
and discretion at the cost of giving legal rules and principles an "artificial
rigour" wholly disproportionate to the clarity of definition or meaning
that can be attained in day-to-day legal practice. 132 They attempted, in
effect, to "'freeze' the meaning" 133 of every legal rule or principle by sug-
gesting that the classifications and divisions found within a developed
legal system, together with the specified conditions for a particular law's
application, can be so complete and comprehensive as to resolve in ad-
vance all conceivable issues that may arise under that law in the future. 134
Hart considered this a dangerous and unsettling attitude toward law. It
commits what he regarded as the "vice" of encouraging legislators and
others to "blindly prejudge" legal issues and cases whose factual composi-
128. See H.L.A. Hart, Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurispru-
dence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265, 269 (1983).
129. Id. at 270.
130. See, e.g., HART, supra note 7, at 126 ("Even when verbally formulated general
rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required by them may break out
in particular concrete cases."). Id. at 128 ("[U]ncertainty at the borderline is the price to
be paid for the use of general classifying terms .... ); Id. at 134 ("The communication of
general rules by authoritative examples brings with it ... indeterminacies .... ). But cf.
H.L.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHI-
LOSOPHY 88, 90-91 (1983) [hereinafter Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law] (Noting
that while many legal terms suffer from a "considerable area of indeterminacy in their
use," most of these terms nevertheless "are sufficiently determinate to make possible gen-
eral agreement in judgments about their application to particular instances.").
131. Hart, supra note 128, at 269.
132. See id. at 270.
133. Id.; HART, supra note 7, at 129.
134. See, e.g., id. at 129-30; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at
104; Hart, supra note 128, at 270.
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tion and social impacts cannot possibly be known.135 As Hart saw it, this
vice of prejudgment ignores or tries to conceal two fundamental and re-
lated characteristics of legal language: that legal rules and principles typi-
cally have a core of settled meaning surrounded by a penumbra of
uncertain application 36 and that the indeterminacies that arise in the pe-
numbra of legal concepts are a result of the inherent "open texture" of
language. 137
B. PROBLEMS IN THE PENUMBRA OF LEGAL CONCEPTS
Lawmakers usually have in mind certain specific applications when
drafting legislation or crafting general rules through judicial processes.
These standard instances lie at what Hart called a rule's "core of settled
meaning."'1 38 Toward these standard cases no doubt lingers as to the
rule's application. Hart's well-known example of an ordinance prohibit-
ing vehicles in a park was meant in part to illustrate this point. Clearly,
automobiles are "vehicles" for purposes of such a rule. 139 To the extent
that questions arise at this core of settled meaning, Hart conceded that
application of the general classifying rule is "unproblematic or 'auto-
matic,"' essentially falling within the deductive method of legal
formalism.1 40
But not all fact situations raise "such familiar, generally unchallenged
cases." 141 Hart noted that outside the core lies a "penumbra of debatable
cases," 142 less familiar fact situations not obviously covered nor unques-
tionably outside the general rule. 143 Here at the borderline of the rule's
extension are those far more difficult cases that share some features in
common, while lacking others or even possessing some features not found
in the standard case."'4 Are, for example, airplanes, bicycles, toy cars, or
roller blades "vehicles" under the ordinance? 145 Hart's answer to this
question took him to those "problems of the penumbra"'146 which, he ar-
gued, reveal the fundamental error of formalist legal thinking.
If it is true that a penumbra of indeterminacy surrounds every legal
rule, then issues that arise in the penumbral area cannot be resolved,
Hart maintained, merely by logical deduction. 147 The application of a
legal rule to issues in the penumbra requires judges to make decisions
135. See Hart, supra note 128, at 270; accord HART, supra note 7, at 129-31; Hart,
Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 104.
136. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 8, at 62-64.
137. See, e.g., HART, supra note 7, at 123-27; Hart, supra note 128, at 269-71, 274-75.
138. Hart, supra note 8, at 63.
139. See HART, supra note 7, at 126; Hart, supra note 8, at 63.
140. HART, supra note 7, at 126.
141. Id.
142. Hart, supra note 8, at 63.
143. See id.; HART, supra note 7, at 126.
144. See Hart, supra note 8, at 63; HART, supra note 7, at 126.
145. See Hart, supra note 8, at 63; HART, supra note 7, at 126.
146. Hart, supra note 8, at 64.
147. See id.
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dictated neither by the express words of the rule nor by logical infer-
ence. 148 Rather, Hart claimed that in such cases the responsibility for
deciding the rule's extension falls squarely on the judge. Whether an air-
plane is a "vehicle" under the ordinance cannot be determined by logical
deduction, but only by practical inquiry into whether airplanes resemble
the standard case of the automobile sufficiently and in legally relevant
respects consistent with the rule's purposes and objectives.1 49 As a result,
Hart observed that deductive reasoning alone is an inadequate model for
the judicial task of deciding whether any case other than the standard
fare falls under a general rule. In the penumbra, judicial decisionmaking
cannot proceed solely by way of the syllogism. 51' He concluded:
And it follows that if legal arguments and legal decisions of penum-
bral questions are to be rational, their rationality must lie in some-
thing other than a logical relation to premises. So if it is rational or
"sound" to argue and to decide that for the purposes of this rule an
aeroplane is not a vehicle, this argument must be sound or rational
without being logically conclusive.1 51
C. THE "OPEN TEXTURE" OF LEGAL LANGUAGE
Hart's argument that the fundamental error of legal formalism can be
traced to problems of the penumbra depends, as he acknowledged, on the
assumption that all legal concepts are surrounded by a penumbral area.
This assumption in turn rests on another concerning the general nature of
language, particularly legal language. With an expression of debt to
Wittgenstein,152 Hart observed that in all areas of human life there is an
inherent limit to our ability to frame rules using general terms and ex-
pressions. Because we cannot foresee all possible combinations of future
circumstances (the "supreme handicap" of human life 153 ), we create rules
and define concepts under a "relative ignorance of fact"'154 as well as a
"relative indeterminacy of aim."1 55 As a result, Hart claimed that we are
incapable of defining concepts so exhaustively as to cover all imaginable
possibilities. 156 Even the most detailed and complex definitions exhibit
what he called an "open texture": an inescapable degree of indetermi-
nacy and uncertainty attending all questions of a concept or general clas-
sifying term's application that fall outside the more or less limited range
of its ordinary, standard cases. 157
According to Hart, this open-textured feature of natural languages
makes it unavoidable that general legal rules and concepts will possess
148. See id. at 63.
149. See HART, supra note 7, at 127.
150. See Hart, supra note 8, at 64.
151. Id.
152. See Hart, supra note 128, at 274-75.
153. Id. at 270.
154. HART, supra note 7, at 128.
155. Id.
156. See Hart, supra note 128, at 275.
157. See id.; HART, supra note 7, at 128.
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core and penumbral areas. He observed that general legal rules of con-
duct tend to specify necessary or sufficient conditions that anything fall-
ing within their scope must satisfy. 158 A rule's "core of settled meaning"
includes the standard, paradigm cases that unquestionably come within
its scope. 159 Yet because we cannot anticipate all future fact situations,
Hart cautioned that no legal concept can be defined so finally and ex-
haustively as to fit all future cases into its core as standard cases. 160 No
matter how precisely a general classificatory rule is formulated, there will
always be unenvisaged cases that will remain indeterminate even after
the most searching analysis under accepted linguistic rules or canons of
interpretation.1 6 1 Moreover, while lawmakers may have certain para-
digm cases in mind while framing a general rule, they may only loosely
articulate or even themselves only vaguely apprehend the overall aim or
objective behind the rule.' 62 Thus, in sum, Hart conceived of a rule's
penumbra as that area of the rule's application left uncertain due to the
relative ignorance of contingent possibilities combined with the relative
indeterminacy of aim that together render all human concepts open-
textured.
Questions that arise in the penumbra of a general legal rule often re-
flect both aspects of the open texture phenomenon: ignorance of fact and
indeterminacy of aim. For example, the general aim of security and quiet
in the park may have been left largely unarticulated and hence indetermi-
nate at the time of the vehicle prohibition ordinance's enactment. 63 If
so, the penumbral cases concerning airplanes, bicycles, and so on, would
have been not only unenvisaged factually but also uncertain due to the
ordinance's indeterminate purpose. 64 And as Hart noted, the resolution
of such cases would then have the twin effect of both settling a specific
question of the rule's application and rendering its initial aim more
determinate. 165
Whatever their clarifying effect, Hart insisted that the disposition of
such "open" cases requires deliberation and consideration of factors be-
yond the syllogism. "The open texture of law means," he wrote, that in
"every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exer-
cise of discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially vague
standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in de-
veloping and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authorita-
tive precedents.' 66 When deciding unenvisaged cases, courts simply
158. See HART, supra note 7, at 128-29.
159. Id. at 126, 129; Hart, supra note 8, at 63.
160. See Hart, supra note 128, at 275.
161. See Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 103.
162. See HART, supra note 7, at 129; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra
note 130, at 103.
163. See HART, supra note 7, at 129.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 135-36.
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must "make a fresh choice."' 16 7 This, Hart thought, is the practical reality
made obvious by acknowledging the open texture of legal language. It is
also the practical insight that reveals the error of legal formalism. In
seeking to suppress judicial choice by characterizing legal concepts as log-
ically closed, the formalists had in effect denied the possibility that legal
concepts could be open-textured. Formalists, that is, effectively con-
ceived of every possible legal case as a standard case falling within a legal
rule's core of settled meaning; there logically cannot be a penumbra sur-
rounding a closed, predetermined concept. Hence, by Hart's account, the
fundamental error of legal formalism, while couched in logical terms, is
grounded ultimately in a misunderstanding of language.
D. A MISTAKE OF LANGUAGE, NOT LoGic
1. The Secondary Importance of Logic to Legal Formalism
Hart gave the American legal realists a good deal of credit for de-
bunking legal formalism and for revealing much of what truly transpires
in adjudicative practice.1 68 Indeed, he saw the realists as having set the
groundwork for recognizing the penumbral problems that pervade legal
concepts and undermine the formalist model of adjudication as a wholly
logical enterprise. 169 Yet he regarded the legal realists and their Euro-
pean free law counterparts as somewhat naive jurists, 70 writers too prone
to exaggeration and too willing to speak carelessly and in unwarranted
extremes. 171 In particular, he found their rhetoric dismissing logic out-
right from judicial practice while endorsing intuition to represent an un-
fortunately obscure and confused perspective. 172
As we have seen, the legal realist and free decision jurists claimed that
the fundamental mistake of formalism lay in an over-reliance on logical
form. 17 3 For their part, the realist and free decision writers sought to
minimize the importance of logic for judicial decisionmaking, sometimes
going so far as to suggest that logic is irrelevant, even a hindrance to
sound adjudication. 174 While Hart agreed that the formalist model of a
paradigmatically logical process poorly depicts adjudicative practice, he
disagreed that the "error of formalism" is grounded in an excessive use of
167. Hart, supra note 128, at 270.
168. See, e.g., HART, supra note 7, at 138-41; Hart, supra note 8, at 63; Hart, Problems
of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 100; H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence
Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 131-32, 133-34, 136-37 (1983) [hereinafter Hart, American Jurispru-
dence Through English Eyes].
169. See Hart, supra note 8, at 62-64.
170. See id. at 62-63.
171. See, e.g., HART, supra note 7, at 139; Hart, supra note 8, at 63; Hart, Problems of
the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 100; Hart, American Jurisprudence Through
English Eyes, supra note 168, at 128, 130, 132.
172. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, supra note 168, at 130;
Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 100, 105.
173. See supra notes 29-126 and accompanying text.




logic. 175 And he strongly took issue with the anti-formalist suggestion
that logic is irrelevant to judicial practice, a practice that he regarded as
an essentially rational enterprise whose end-product, like it or not, largely
involves the application and creation of general rules. 176
To Hart, the realist and free decision identification of logic as the root
evil of formalism is a misnomer, a confusion on their part as to what for-
malist jurisprudence truly offends. 177 It cannot be logic, Hart claimed, for
logic is an inert force that by itself neither determines the interpretation
of words nor the scope of general classifications. 178 That is,
[L]ogic does not prescribe interpretation of terms; it dictates neither
the stupid nor intelligent interpretation of any expression. Logic
only tells you hypothetically that if you give a certain term a certain
interpretation then a certain conclusion follows. Logic is silent on
how to classify particulars-and this is the heart of a judicial
decision. 179
While the formalists had advocated strict adherence to deductive form
in judicial decisionmaking, Hart realized, where the realists and free deci-
sion jurists had not, that the syllogism is for legal formalism of only sec-
ondary importance. It is a logical tool that complements a prior and
more fundamental consideration. This is the assumption that all legal
concepts are definitionally fixed and that every legal system can be seen
as a coherent, comprehensive whole wherein all questions of meaning or
interpretation are predetermined according to a set of basic legal norms
or philosophical postulates.' 80 The syllogism merely provides a logical
framework for sound reasoning within such a complete and comprehen-
sive system. As Hart saw it, the root evil of formalist thinking thus has
much less to do with logic than language. Formalism offends and poses a
pernicious threat to sound judicial practice because it assumes the defini-
tional closure of all legal terms and concepts. It is this attitude toward
linguistic definition and meaning that undergirds the formalist vice of en-
couraging blind prejudgment of legal issues. 81 For it is through this atti-
tude that formalism treats the "open texture" of legal terms and concepts
as a logical impossibility. It is because of this attitude, that is, that formal-
ism regards it as inconceivable that interpretive problems could ever arise
in the penumbra of a legal concept, for words that are wholly fixed and
circumscribed can only have cores of settled meaning. This attitude, in
effect, provides the theoretical basis for the formalist characterization of
judicial decisionmaking as a discretionless process involving no real free-
175. Hart, supra note 8, at 64.
176. See HART, supra note 7, at 136.
177. See Hart, supra note 8, at 67; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note
130, at 105.
178. See Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 104.
179. Hart, supra note 8, at 67.
180. See Hart, supra note 128, at 269. See generally supra notes 11-20 and accompany-
ing text.
181. See Hart, supra note 128, at 270; HART, supra note 7, at 130, 130; Hart, Problems
of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 104.
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dom of choice. Hence, it is in this linguistic attitude, Hart concluded, in
this unshakable belief that general terms and concepts can be logically
closed or fixed, unblemished by ambiguity or open texture, that we find
the true theoretical crux-and the fundamental error-of legal
formalism. 182
2. Linguistic Closure and the "Formalist Judge"
Only by recognizing that the fundamental error of legal formalism is
grounded in this way in language, not logic, is it possible, Hart thought, to
answer the question, "What precisely is it for a judge to commit this er-
ror, to be a 'formalist' . . . ?",183 Hart did not think that the legal realists
had answered this question sufficiently, despite the anti-formalist criti-
cisms that filled their works.184 In the end, their rhetoric about excessive
uses of logic resulted only in confusion and ambiguity.1 85 Yet Hart saw in
their writings a kernel of understanding of the true error of formalism.
He wrote: "What the critics intend to stigmatize by these [references to
logic] is the failure of courts, when applying legal rules or precedents, to
take advantage of the relative indeterminacy of the rules or precedents to
give effect to social aims, policies, and values."186 That is, Hart credited
the early critics of formalism with recognizing implicitly that the basic
error of formalism lay in an attitude toward language that denied the
open texture of words and concepts. And while they never directly ar-
ticulated or even fully understood that point, those early critics clearly
perceived the vice of prejudgment that formalism encouraged law-mak-
ing, especially judicial law-making, under an illusory veil of objectivity
and logical predetermination.
For his part, Hart sought to give the account of judicial formalism that
the realist and free decision theorists had failed to provide. He noted
that a "formalist judge" would not (could not) acknowledge the delibera-
tive choice over social aims, values, and consequences that is entailed by
the open texture of language. The essence of the judge's error, Hart
claimed, is that he or she will give some general classifying rule an inter-
pretation that is blind to social policies, values, and consequences. 187 The
judge will not realize, or will choose to ignore, that the rule lends itself to
various plausible interpretations over which he or she has a choice left
uncontrolled by the accepted linguistic or interpretive conventions. 88 He
or she will not see, that is, that the case at hand falls into the rule's pe-
numbra. 189 Rather than acknowledging the rule's open texture and then
182. See Hart, supra note 128, at 269.
183. Hart, supra note 8, at 66.
184. See id.
185. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, supra note 168, at 130-
34; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 100, 104-05.
186. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 104.
187. See Hart, supra note 8, at 66; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note
130, at 104.




deliberating over how best to fill its given aims and values of social im-
portance, the judge will find its meaning predetermined, requiring only
his or her discovery. Hart identified several ways in which this formalist
"discovery" of legal meaning could take place. The judge, he wrote,
could either-
take[ ] the meaning that the word most obviously suggests in its ordi-
nary non-legal context to ordinary men, or one which the word has
been given in some other legal context, or, still worse, he [or she
could] think[ ] of a standard case and then arbitrarily identif[y] cer-
tain features in it . . . , treat[ing] these ... as always necessary and
always sufficient conditions for the use in all contexts of the word
.... ,irrespective of the social consequences of giving it this
interpretation.' 90
Hart found the prospect that judicial decisionmaking could ever occur
in this fashion to be unsettling and frightful, well deserving the label "au-
tomatic" or "mechanical."' 19' Yet if ever such mechanical ways should
creep into a judicial decision involving a penumbral issue, 192 he main-
tained that the formalist "discovery" of legal meaning would not be dic-
tated by logic, but by judicial choice. For as the "heart" of a judicial
decision lies in the classification of particulars, 193 any court that sets out
to apply a general classificatory rule to a particular fact situation must
make a choice as to whether the case falls under the rule. 194 Even the
judge who would claim to be constrained by logic or linguistic convention
must, Hart claimed, at the very least have made the choice to be so
bound. And this, he emphasized, is a choice grounded in social policy, 195
i.e., perhaps the policy that legislatures, not courts, should decide matters
falling within a certain field of social regulation.
Hence, by Hart's account, the fundamental mistake legal formalists
make in assuming the definitional closure of legal concepts spreads an
illusory veil around the judicial process. By claiming that legal meaning is
fixed for all time, formalism creates a model of adjudicative practice that
includes no discretion or freedom of choice. But when issues arise in the
penumbra of a legal concept, interpretive choice is unavoidable. Formal-
ism, therefore, erects an adjudicative model that cannot be replicated in
practice. Any judges who would fancy that they fit that model would be
deceiving themselves and, worse yet, the litigants and others who will be
affected by their decisions. Were such a judge to blindly adopt some
definition or classification scheme determined previously when no con-
sideration was or could have been given to the precise composition of
facts and social consequences presented by the case at bar, he or she
190. Id.
191. See id. at 67-68.
192. Hart kindly suggested that perhaps no judge has ever fallen fully into the formalist
mold. See id. ("But it is at least doubtful whether any judicial decisions (even in England)
have been quite as automatic as this.").
193. See id. at 67.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 68.
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would commit the vice of prejudgment. Yet the judge would still have
made a choice, for prejudgment does not entail predetermination. Pre-
judgment is a vice precisely because it involves a choice, unfortunately
the choice to blindly extend a definition to encompass a factual situation
unenvisaged at the time of its framing.
To Hart, therefore, the "formalist judge" would either lack a true con-
ception of the interpretive freedom inherent in judicial practice or be less
than honest in his or her approach to the practice. In so assessing formal-
ism, he stood firmly alongside the realist and free decision writers. They,
it will be recalled, repeatedly railed against formalism for having shielded
the reality of judicial freedom. Yet Hart refused to endorse the position
they took-the position that if there is any open texture, then judges are
largely unbound and adjudication becomes primarily a matter of intuitive
judgment.
IV. INTUITION AND THE POSITIVE BOUNDS OF
JUDICIAL FREEDOM
A. FREE DECISION WITHIN THE LOGIC OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
To a great extent, the legal realist and free legal decision jurists re-
sponded to legal formalism by portraying adjudication as a process far
more influenced by intuition and emotion than logic. Within the free de-
cision movement, Ernst Fuchs encouraged judges to craft decisions that
stand in "harmony with a feeling for justice," 196 while Justice Gmelin
claimed, largely from his own experience on the bench, that true justice
more often results from judges who consult their "subjective sense of jus-
tice,"'197 than from those who strive to perform "cold, logical ratiocina-
tions."'198 The legal realists concurred. Judges Hutcheson and Frank
stressed the importance of the "hunch" for judicial decisionmaking.1 99
This "intuitive flash of understanding" 20 0 is, on their accounts, the true
determining ground of judicial decisions. 20 1 Similarly, Herman Oliphant
argued that the outcomes in judicial decisions are generally "not dictated
by logic, '20 2 but by an "intuition of fitness of solution to problem. '20 3
Professor Hart thought that this emphasis on intuition and emotion
amounts to a rather extreme and puzzling response to formalism. While
he shared the realist and free decision distaste for formalist jurispru-
dence, he could not endorse their alternative picture of the judicial pro-
cess. To him, their rhetoric dismissing logic and endorsing intuition was
196. FucHs, supra note 36, at 28.
197. Gmelin, supra note 38, at 127.
198. Id. at 88.
199. See Hutcheson, supra note 5, at 275; FRANK, supra note 19, at 103-05, 145; FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 170, 173-74.
200. Hutcheson, supra note 5, at 278.
201. See id. at 275-79; FRANK, supra note 19, at 103-05, 145; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,
supra note 68, at 170-74, 183-84.
202. Oliphant, supra note 63, at 160.
203. Id. at 159.
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internally incoherent when considered in light of the constraints on judi-
cial practice that are inherent in the concept of law. To see this, we
should turn to his positivist account of the foundations of a legal system.
1. Judicial Practice Within a Framework of Secondary Rules
Law, Hart was wont to say, is a "union of primary and secondary
rules. '20 4 The secondary rules are designed to specify how the primary
rules of obligation can be conclusively identified, introduced, changed,
eliminated, or determined to have been breached.2°15 Among the secon-
dary rules that he considered essential to a developed legal system is what
he called the "rule of recognition. ' 20 6 This rule, the "ultimate rule" of a
legal system, 207 stipulates how to identify the system's primary rules.208
Another essential type of secondary rule is the class he referred to as
"rules of adjudication," 20 9 the set of rules within a legal system that allow
for authoritative determinations regarding the violation of primary
rules. 210 Together, these two types of secondary rules work toward creat-
ing a conception of law wherein judicial decisionmaking appears as an
overwhelmingly rational, rule-governed practice.
Hart explained that a legal system's rule of recognition will indicate the
extent to which the judgments of its courts will count as a source of law211
and what status they will enjoy within the system's hierarchy of laws.212
He further noted that the system's rules of adjudication will set forth
qualifying and identifying criteria regarding the appointment or election
of those who will wield judicial power.213 Moreover, the rules of adjudi-
cation will outline the procedures that the jurisdiction's judges will be
expected to follow. 2 14
By giving due consideration to these secondary rules of recognition and
adjudication, Hart thought that the incoherence of the legal realist and
free decision positions becomes readily apparent. Some in those move-
ments, he noted, take their disavowal of logic and endorsement of the
intuitive freedom of judges so far as to suggest that the law consists solely
of judicial decisions and educated predictions of future court action. 215
This position, which Hart labelled "rule-scepticism," 21 6 essentially dis-
misses as a myth all talk of general legal rules and of judicial decisions as
204. HART, supra note 7, at 99.
205. See id. at 94.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 105, 106, 292.
208. See id. at 94-95.
209. Id. at 97.
210. See id. at 96.
211. See id. at 97.
212. See id. at 95.
213. See id. at 96-97.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 136. Hart was here quite obviously thinking most of Judge Frank and
Professor Gray. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
267 (1909) ("Law is what the judges declare"). See also FRANK, supra note 19, at 33-41.
216. HART, supra note 7, at 136.
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logical derivations therefrom. John Chipman Gray, for example, main-
tained that "the Law is made up of the rules for decision which the courts
lay down; ... that rules for conduct which the courts do not apply are not
Law; that the fact that the courts apply rules is what makes them Law. '217
In part, Hart found this point-of-view facially "unrealistic, ' 218 as he con-
sidered it difficult to imagine anyone seriously holding that it takes judi-
cial action in a concrete case to give a duly enacted statute the full status
of law.219 But more importantly, he argued that this position falls, para-
doxically, from the weight of its own logical incoherence. For it is only by
virtue of a general legal rule, i.e., the rule of recognition, that judicial
decisions in any particular society enjoy special authoritative status.
Without general rules, therefore, Hart observed that the very judicial de-
cisions said by some free law and realist jurists to be the true source of
law would be bereft of any authoritative import at all. He wrote:
Stated in an unqualified general form, so as to embrace both secon-
dary and primary rules, it is indeed quite incoherent; for the asser-
tion that there are decisions of courts cannot consistently be
combined with the denial that there are any rules at all. This is so
because . . . the existence of a court entails the existence of secon-
dary rules conferring jurisdiction on a changing succession of individ-
uals and so making their decisions authoritative. In a community of
people who understood the notions of a decision and a prediction of
a decision, but not the notion of a rule, the idea of an authoritative
decision would be lacking and with it the idea of a court. There
would be nothing to distinguish the decision of a private person from
that of a court.220
In addition, Hart found even the more moderate realist position that
judicial decisions are the principal, though not the only, source of law to
be offensive to the idea that law is founded in part on secondary rules of
recognition and adjudication. It is the rule of recognition, he noted, that
determines the relative order of primacy and subordination among a legal
system's sources of law.221 Yet since a legal system's rule of recognition is
often not explicitly stated, it becomes necessary to look at the day-to-day
operations of the system in order to ascertain its legal hierarchy. 222 Such
an empirical inquiry shows, for example, that in England acts of Parlia-
ment hold primacy over common law and customary rules, while in the
United States legislative action and the common law are subordinate to
the Constitution. The precise status of judicial decisions vis-A-vis either
of these legal systems, as well as the methods of decision making appro-
priate within their courts, can only be ascertained and understood by
searching empirically for evidence, stated or unstated, of their rules of
217. GRAY, supra note 215, at 115.
218. See H.L.A. Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 309, 340 (1983).
219. See id.
220. HART, supra note 7, at 136.




recognition and adjudication. It requires taking, that is, an "internal
point of view" toward the life of the legal system overall, toward its adju-
dicative practices in particular. 223
Hart did not think that the legal realists or their free decision counter-
parts had succeeded in taking an internalist perspective. While they had
repeatedly chided the formalists for not acknowledging the "real" nature
of adjudication, on Hart's account they themselves had failed in this re-
gard. For by rhetorically dismissing logic and elevating intuition in judi-
cial practice, while simultaneously depreciating the importance of all
legal rules grounded in sources outside judicial decisions, they assembled
an approach to judicial practice that stood in important respects at odds
with that practice understood internally. To Hart, their regard for the
primacy of judicial decisions was unreflective of any legal system, even
that of the United States.224 Lacking any empirical grounding, it could
not seriously be said to have been drawn from an internal understanding
of any legal system's rule of recognition. Similarly, their abjuration of
logic drew its force from their own theoretical works, not from an accu-
rate, empirical study of how judges really decide cases under any jurisdic-
tion's rules of adjudication. In short, Hart regarded the realists, no less
than the formalists before them, as legal theorists trying to impose an
external theoretical structure on the practice of adjudication.
2. The Limited Scope of Judicial Intuition
The general perspective set forth by legal realism and free legal deci-
sion thus provided, in Hart's view, an inadequate descriptive account of
law and judicial practice. Their misunderstanding of the true error of
legal formalism led them to adopt a posture regarding the relative impor-
tance of logic and intuition in judicial decision that, to Hart, "appears...
not to have advanced legal theory far or to have added much to the stock
of valuable jurisprudential ideas. '225 Yet he did acknowledge that some
realist scholarship, especially those works describing and analyzing vari-
ous substantive areas of the law, had contributed to a greater understand-
ing of legal decision. 226 And he further praised them for bringing to the
fore one vital consideration relative to the role of intuition in adjudica-
tion: the importance of openly acknowledging judicial freedom and all
factors that enter into judicial decision making, including intuition. One
of the main effects of legal realism is:
to convince many judges and lawyers, practical and academic, ...
that judges should not seek to bootleg silently into the law their own
conceptions of the law's aims or justice or social policy or other ex-
tra-legal elements required for decision, but should openly identify
223. Id. at 102.
224. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, supra note 168, at 130-
32.
225. Id. at 132.
226. See id.
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and discuss them.227
But calling attention to the fact that extra-legal considerations, includ-
ing intuitions, sometimes enter into judicial decision making, Hart in-
sisted, does not mean that the judicial process is inherently "free" or
essentially intuitive in nature. To the extent intuition does enter into the
practice, he maintained it is an importantly practice-bound intuition, an
exercise of intuition that amounts effectively to an "'unthinking' compli-
ance" 228 with rules of adjudication that "the judge was antecedently dis-
posed to observe. '229
Now it is true that neither the legal realists nor free decision jurists
contemplated a wholly unbound notion of judicial freedom. They all, to
varying degrees, assumed certain limits on the exercise of judicial intui-
tion. Judge Hutcheson, for example, stressed that the "hunch" he found
central to the judicial process was an intuitive judgment informed and
bounded by the practice of adjudication itself.23°1 And Justice Gmelin ac-
knowledged that the judicial sense of justice could only lighten the harsh-
ness of the written law so far as the existing rule would allow itself to be
moved. 231
Hart, however, conceived of the exercise of intuition in judicial practice
in a wholly different light than the realist and free law theorists. Whereas
they saw it as an independent factor in the judicial process, one to be
acknowledged and treated as separate from rational deliberation, Hart
perceived it as part of the deliberative process of legal reasoning itself.
He explained that often people who accept a rule as binding will act in
compliance with it without first consciously giving thought to the rule.
For example, car drivers who stop at red lights and chess players who
move pieces to certain squares very often are engaged in "rule-complying
behavior," 232 even though their actions may be taken in "direct response
to the situation, unmediated by calculation in terms of the rules. '233
Whether such actions truly are instances of rule-compliance depends,
Hart claimed, on "their setting in certain circumstances. ' 234 Most impor-
tantly, it depends on whether the person acting would genuinely defend
the action by reference to the rule in question. Hart explained:
The most important of these factors which show that in acting we
have applied a rule is that if our behaviour is challenged we are dis-
posed to justify it by reference to the rule: and the genuineness of
our acceptance of the rule may be manifested not only in our past
and subsequent general acknowledgements of it and conformity to it,
but in our criticism of our own and others' deviation from it.235
227. Id.
228. HART, supra note 7, at 140.
229. Id. at 141.
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What appears to be intuitive action very often is fully rule-complying
behavior undertaken by persons so accustomed to following a certain rule
that they do so without consciously thinking of the rule itself. By Hart's
account, this is the nature of judicial intuition. Judges educated and
trained in law and the practice of adjudication can be well expected to
follow their jurisdiction's rules of adjudication without giving every detail
of juridical procedure conscious recognition. Within the setting estab-
lished by the circumstances of judicial practice, a judge's actions should
be understood as rule-complying if the judge grounds the justification of
his or her actions in the court's rules of procedure or accepted principles
of justiciability or legal reasoning. It is this setting of the judge's action
within the practice of adjudication, Hart maintained, "and not its accom-
paniment by explicit thought of the rule, that is necessary to distinguish
an action which is genuinely an observance of a rule from one that merely
happens to coincide with it. '"236
This conception of judicial intuition contrasts markedly with the views
of the legal realists and free decision jurists. To Hart, they confused intui-
tion properly understood with psychological questions about the factors
and thought processes judges use in reaching their decisions. 237 The re-
sult was a notion of intuition as a psychological process independent of
rule following or rational deliberation. For many in those movements
this psychological notion constituted the true basis of a judicial decision,
the critical factor that entered into the decision making process prior to
rational deliberation. Accordingly, reason, especially the employment of
deductive syllogisms, amounted merely to window-dressing, a pretext or
after-the-fact rationalization for a decision already reached.
Hart thought this notion of judicial intuition set forth a picture of judi-
cial practice just as unsettling as the model of legal formalism. By his
reckoning, justified and justifiable judicial action must not only conform
with but also be done in observance of the applicable rules of adjudica-
tion. A judge whose apparently intuitive decision or behavior is chal-
lenged, that is, could only justify his or her action by genuine appeal to
the rules of adjudication and the circumstances of judicial practice. 238
Such an appeal, however, falls outside the notion of intuition endorsed by
legal realism and free law theory. For those jurists, judges who would
appeal to the rules of adjudication would be dishonest and engaged in
pretense. Yet paradoxically, Hart saw, as they did not, that the overall
social acceptance of the rules of adjudication means that if judges were
truly to act intuitively in the realist and free law sense, they could not
honestly admit the intuitive grounding of their decisions without re-
vealing a breach of their legal system's basic, foundational rules. That is,
the realist and free decision notion of judicial intuition, while to a certain
extent limited by the practice of adjudication, is an outlaw notion, one
236. Id. at 140.
237. See id. at 139-40.
238. See id. at 140-41.
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indefensible within any legal system regulated by rules of adjudication.
Fortunately, Hart concluded, that notion also provides a generally inaccu-
rate picture of how judges really decide cases. He wrote:
Some judicial decisions may be like this, but it is surely evident that
for the most part decisions, like the chess-player's moves, are
reached either by genuine effort to conform to rules consciously
taken as guiding standards of decision or, if intuitively reached, are
justified by rules which the judge was antecedently disposed to ob-
serve and whose relevance to the case in hand would generally be
acknowledged.2 3 9
B. THE RESILIENCE AND FORCE OF LOGIC
Taken as a whole, the approach to law advocated by the realist and free
decision jurists thus appeared to Hart quite confusing and untenable.
They set forth an overall picture of law that stressed the primacy of judi-
cial decisions and the scope of judicial freedom in ways neither logically
nor empiricially defensible. And they recommended a psychological no-
tion of judicial intuition that no judge could openly acknowledge and that
overlooked the truly important sense in which intuitive judgment legiti-
mately and regularly occurs in judicial practice. Yet to Hart, the most
puzzling aspect of these movements was their virulent opposition and
wholehearted effort to denigrate logic.
While he shared the realist and free decision distaste for formalist juris-
prudence, Hart appeared genuinely mystified by the extent to which they
railed against any suggestion that logic, particularly deductive logic, is an
important factor in the judicial process. He saw their position as counter-
intuitive to what seemed most obvious about adjudication-that it is fun-
damentally a rational practice. Not only did he not consider logic to be
the evil underlying legal formalism, he did not consider it anathema to
judicial decision at all. The end product of judicial action, he noted, typi-
cally is a particular conclusion instantiated from a general classificatory
rule. 24° While the general rule may well be open-textured requiring an
informed judicial choice, and while a court may need to consider, by way
of analogical reasoning, how the fact situation at bar resembles previous
cases, the process of instantiation itself is one of deductive reasoning.
Hence, Hart found the very suggestion that logic is an untoward and dis-
posable feature of judicial practice to be at best enigmatic.2 41
This is not to suggest that Hart agreed in any meaningful respect with
formalism. His recognition of the central importance of logic for judicial
practice should not be taken in any way as a concession to formalism. He
remained as resolute a critic of it as the free decision and legal realist
jurists. Yet he also stood as a critic toward those critics themselves, for
239. Id. at 141.
240. See id. at 136.
241. See, e.g., Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 130, at 100; Hart,




their strident opposition to formalism had clouded their ability to per-
ceive the true relevance and force of logic within judicial practice.
Hart observed, for example, that the legal realists had commonly cited
the Supreme Court's early twentieth century line of economic due pro-
cess cases as paradigmatic of the evils of judicial formalism. 242 They had
maintained, that is, that Lochner v. New York 243 and its progeny are
cases-in-point of the excessive and improvident use of logic in judicial
decision. Hart noted, however, that the error of those cases, like the er-
ror of formalism overall, is one of language, not logic. A deductive syllo-
gism has not the force nor inclination to "dictate the interpretation of
laws or of anything else. '244 The Supreme Court had not unduly relied
on logic, Hart claimed, but had merely used it to derive a conclusion it
found foreordained in a reading of the federal Constitution that mistak-
enly treated the due process clause as fixed in meaning for all time. It
was not the Court's method of reasoning or arriving at its conclusions
that was offensive, but its propensity toward "freezing . . . any single
interpretation of [a] rule of law into a fixed premise, immune from revi-
sion and to be used in all further cases of its application. '245
The economic due process line of cases, therefore, just like any other
where a court commits the error of prejudgment, reflects the formalist
mistake of not seeing, or not wanting to see, the open texture of a legal
term or concept. While Hart acknowledged that such cases may well ex-
hibit "great stupidity," 246 they manifest "no more 'logic', and no less"
than any case wherein a particular conclusion is instantiated from a gen-
eral classificatory rule.247 The critical question becomes one of inquiring
into how the court decided upon the classification of particulars that it
chose. That choice over whether to classify under one rule or another
constitutes, on Hart's account, the "heart" of judicial decisionmaking. 248
Formalism presents a threat to sound judicial practice by concealing this
critical choice behind the illusion of objectivity and logical predetermina-
tion. This concealment hides the true freedom inherent in judicial prac-
tice and gives rise to the vice of prejudgment.
Yet Hart found the realist and free decision alternative equally perni-
cious. He took no solace in their suggestion that judges should classify
particulars according to their intuitions, their "hunches,' 249 their "subjec-
tive [and] individual sense[s] of justice. ' 250 For on his account, the best
guaranty of justice is not, as Judge Frank had thought, a legion of judges
with full and complete "knowledge of the character of [their] powers and
242. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, supra note 168, at 127,
130-31; Hart, supra note 8, at 68.
243. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
244. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, supra note 168, at 130.
245. Id. at 131.
246. Hart, supra note 8, at 67.
247. Id.
248. See id.
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250. Gmelin, supra note 38, at 125.
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of [their] own prejudices and weaknesses. ' 251 Nor is it, as Justice Gmelin
had suggested, a court presided over by judges who temper the some-
times cold demands of logic with what they personally "feel to be right
and just."'252 Rather, to Hart, the best guaranty of justice through judicial
practice is for judges to readily acknowledge the open texture of legal
concepts; for them to face openly and honestly problems of legal defini-
tion and meaning when they arise in a concept's penumbra; and for them
to classify particulars, to reason, to use logic, and to intuit within the rec-
ognized rules of adjudication of their respective legal systems.
V. CONCLUSION
The logic-intuition debate thus occupies a central position in Professor
Hart's philosophy of law. Some of his most significant contributions to
jurisprudential thought-the open texture argument; the recognition that
each legal concept has a core of settled meaning surrounded by an inde-
terminate penumbral area; the idea that law is comprised in important
part of secondary rules; the analytic approach of viewing law in a descrip-
tive fashion reflecting an internal point-of-view-were devised in part to
address it. Yet beyond the debate's relevance to the development of his
own philosophical ideas, Hart's treatment of it marks a major step toward
its clarification, if not its eventual resolution. By identifying language,
not logic, as the root error of legal formalism, Hart substantially
refocused the debate, leading to a clearer account of both the danger
posed by formalist legal thinking and the mistakes engendered by the
realist and free decision jurists.
As we have seen, Hart explained that the danger presented by formal-
ism originates in an attitude toward language that treats legal concepts as
logically closed and legal systems as complete and comprehensive harmo-
nious wholes. This attitude, he showed, prevents formalists from ac-
knowledging the open texture of legal language and the interpretive
problems in the penumbra that follow therefrom. Worse yet, it leads
them to enshroud judicial practice behind an illusory veil of objectivity
and predetermination, shielding from clear view the extent of free choice
inherent in the practice and encouraging judges to commit the vicious
injustice of prejudgment.
At the same time, Hart's acute realization that deductive logic is
merely an effective tool, not the foundation of legal formalism, moved
him to question as well the plausibility of legal realism and free law the-
ory. Jurists from those movements had premised their adjudicative theo-
ries, particularly their endorsement of intuition in judicial practice, on
what Hart revealed to be the mistaken view that logic is the root error of
formalism. By examining their general approach within the context of his
positivist account of law, Hart determined that their claim that intuition is
251. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 68, at 412.
252. Gmelin, supra note 38, at 89.
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the true basis of judicial decision neither squares with the foundational
elements of a legal system nor provides a workable descriptive account of
adjudicative practice. Intuition simply cannot, he concluded, be the cen-
tral feature of the judicial process within any legal system regulated in
part by secondary rules of recognition and adjudication.
In sum, Hart saw judicial decisionmaking as an essentially rational en-
terprise whose end product, the application of general rules to particular
concrete cases, depends to a great extent on deductive logic. To a lesser
degree, but still in an important sense, he acknowledged the role intuition
performs in the practice. By so melding logic and intuition, Hart pro-
vided a descriptive account of adjudication that is unencumbered by doc-
trinaire theorizing about logic or the psychological impulses that may or
may not weigh into a particular judge's deliberations. Judging obviously
involves more, he thought, than logical deductions from predetermined
rules and principles. Yet it equally ill befits the practice to cast it as noth-
ing more than sentimental hunches and emotion-driven directives. Adju-
dication is a practice-bound enterprise, defined by the range of
permissible activities set forth within a legal system's secondary rules of
recognition and adjudication. And no jurisprudential theory, he claimed,
can soundly pretend that the essence of the practice lies either in the
mechanical derivation of syllogistic conclusions or in an array of emotive
factors which judges themselves cannot openly acknowledge.
[Vol. 52
